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NOTES
The Use of Business Property As Short-Term
Trust Corpus
I. INTRODUCION-ThE PLANNING PROBLEM PRESENTED*
A progressive income tax structure encourages the taxpayer with
income above his consumption level to attempt to shift income to
other members of his family group where it would be taxed at lower
rates. The income which the taxpayer desires to shift may be in the
form of compensation for services rendered by the taxpayer or of
income from income-producing property owned by him. Attempts
to shift compensation for the taxpayer's services are generally frus-
trated by application of the well-established principle that income is
to be taxed to the person who earns it.1 Income from income-pro-
ducing property, however, may be shifted by a transfer which
renders a person other than the taxpayer the "owner" of income-
producing property at the time the income is realized.2 The donee
is taxable on the income under the principle that income from property
is to be taxed to the owner of the property.3 The estate planning
uses of the short-term trust to transfer the ownership, and thereby
the income, of income-producing property during the years in which
a taxpayer's earned income is most substantial are well known.4
Prior to 1954, whether the trust was the "owner," for tax purposes,
of the property transferred to it was determined on a case by case
basis by evaluating the "dominion and control" retained by the
grantor over the trust corpus.5 The uncertainty inherent in this
*This note was awarded first prize in the 1966 Estate Planning Competition spon-
sored by the First National Bank of Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Burnet v. Leninger, 285
U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
2. This principle is fully considered in Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1936).
3. This rule is a correlative to the principle discussed in the text accompanying note
1 supra.
4. CAsNmE, ESTATE PLANNIWG 168-74 (3d ed. 1961). The shifting of income from
property for the term of the trust is the objective sought in the use of a short-term
trust. The settlor of the short-term trust will be deemed to have made a gift of the
interest transferred for federal gift tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(g) (1961).
Also, the value of the reversionary interest is includible in the settlor's gross estate
should he die prior to the expiration of the trust. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1963).
Some of the uses of the short-term trust to satisfy family estate planning needs are
presented in the following articles: Poindexter, How a Short-Term Trust Solves
Four Typical Family Financial Problems, 12 J. TAXATioN 286 (1960); Yoblin, Assign-
ment and Deflection of Income, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX 147, 151-54 (1962).
5. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1939); Blair v. Commissioner, supra note 2. In Helvering v. Clifford,
supra, the Supreme Court made the following observation concerning the determina-
tion left to the courts: "The failure of Congress to adopt any such rule of thumb for
that type of trust must be taken to do no more than to leave to the triers of fact the
initial determination of whether or not on the facts of each case the grantor remains the
owner for purposes of Section 22(a)." Id. at 338.
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approach led to the enactment of the "Clifford section"6 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.7 The legislative intent behind these
sections was the enactment of precise standards to determine when
a trust was to be considered the "substantial owner" of the trust
corpus for income tax purposes.8 Under the criteria established by
Congress, the trust is the owner of the trust corpus (and the income
produced thereby taxable to it or to the beneficiaries)9 if the duration
of the trust is at least ten years, 0 if certain prohibited powers over
the disposition" or the administration 2 of the trust corpus are not
retained by the grantor, and if the corpus or income of the trust may
not be used for the grantor's benefit.13
While sections 671-78 themselves impose no limitations upon the
kind of property which may be utilized as trust corpus, the condi-
tions of trust validity outlined above suggest the conclusion that the
trust is available only to persons who have accumulated investment
property with which they can afford to part for at least ten years. 14
This conclusion, however, would render the short-term trust idea
inaccessible to the considerable number of persons whose estate plan-
ning needs suggest the use of such a trust and who have accumulated
substantial income-producing property, but whose assets are largely
vital components of a trade or business.
This article seeks to explore the extent to which the benefits of the
short-term trust can be secured for this latter class of persons by
utilizing business assets as trust corpus in the following manner: (1)
by transferring to the trust specific assets which are leased back by
the grantor for continued use in his business; or (2) by transferring
to the trust a partnership interest in the grantor's business.
II. ThE TANsFFn AND LEASEBACK AmRANGEMENT
A. Planning the Transaction-Fornal Aspects and Tax Considerations
The transfer and leaseback arrangement generally follows one
of several basic patterns. 5 The most usual plan is for the taxpayer
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78.
7. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 86 (1954).
8. Ibid.
9. The income taxation of trusts and their beneficiaries is provided for at INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 641-69.
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 674.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 675.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 676-77.
14. See CAsNuE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 172.
15. The illustrations are taken from the facts of cases in which the arrangement
has received court approval.
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to transfer by gift'6 some form of business property such as machinery
or a building and land to a trustee. Thereafter, by prearrangement,
the grantor and the trustee enter into an agreement whereby the
property is leased back to the grantor.17 A variation of this plan is
for the taxpayer to establish the trust with an initial gift of cash. The
cash is then used to purchase assets necessary to the business of the
grantor, and the assets are leased by the trustee to the grantor or his
controlled corporation.18 Where the taxpayer's business is conducted
in corporate form, another variant of the basic plan may be present.
The controlled corporation transfers assets to the taxpayer by sale 19
or by a dividend in kind. The assets are then transferred to a trust
created by the taxpayer, and the trustee leases the assets back to the
corporation. 0
The desired tax consequences from the arrangement are that the
rentals paid under the lease agreement will be deductible by the
grantor (or by his controlled corporation) and the income from the
rentals will be taxed to the trust or the beneficiaries. If these conse-
quences are achieved, the grantor's gross income will be reduced and
the income of other members of the family group increased by a
like amount. The estate planning objective is realized-the utilization
of business assets as short-term trust corpus with minimal disruptive
effect on the grantor's trade or business.
There are several subsidiary tax considerations in evaluating tax
effectiveness of the transfer and leaseback arrangement in a given
case: (1) The income-splitting provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code eliminate the need for,21 and sometimes the desirability of,
22
interspousal shifting of income. (2) The higher the taxpayer's tax
bracket and the lower that of the trust or its beneficiaries the greater
16. Because of the tax problems attendant to the sale of property between related
parties, the sale and leaseback is rarely used to shift income within the family group.
See INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 267, 1239.
17. See, e.g., Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Alden B.
Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
18. See, e.g., Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.
1953) (leaseback to controlled corporation); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954)
(leaseback to grantor).
19. The tax problems attendant to the sale of property between related parties are
similarly present in such a transaction between a corporation and its controlling stock-
holder. See note 16 supra. However, the sale and leaseback may be useful to the
corporation in meeting other financial problems. See Cary, Current Tax Problems. on
Sale, or Gift, and Lease-back Transactions, N.Y.U. 9TH INST. ON FED. TAX 959 (1951);
Clark, Changing Considerations in Sales and Leasebacks, 42 TAXES 725 (1964);
Friedman, Lease or Purchase of Equipment; Sale and Leaseback, N.Y.U. 14TH INST.
oN FED. TAx 1427 (1956); Lassers, Does a Lease-Back Save You Money, 32 TAXES 279
(1954).
20. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Greenspun, 156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946).
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013.
22. See CAsNFn, op. cit. supra note 4, at 783-84.
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will be the tax savings effected. (3) The transfer of the property
will result in the grantor's loss of any depreciation deduction on the
asset transferred and an investment credit previously received may
have to be recaptured in part.23 Therefore, non-depreciable property
such as land, or property which is substantially depreciated, should
be utilized as trust corpus where available 4 (4) A gift tax will
be incurred on the transfer to the trust. However, the specific exemp-
tion2 and the exclusion allowed a husband and wife26 may render
this insignificant.
Should the arrangement be held invalid for tax purposes, the
grantor is denied the rental deduction and incurs a gift tax on the
transfer to the trust which is measured by the present worth of the
right to receive the net rentals from the property during the term of
the trust.27
B. Planning the Transaction-The Commissioner's Attack and
the Criteria Established by the Courts
In early cases, the Commissioner attacked the transfer and lease-
back arrangement on an "incomplete gift" theory under the doctrine
of Helvering v. Clifford,28 emphasizing the dominion and control re-
tained by the grantor.29 In the more recent cases, however, the
Commissioner has changed the form of his argument to include an
analysis of the provisions of section 162(a) (3) and the contention that
the controls retained by the grantor preclude a rental deduction under
these provisions.o
The planning trap for the taxpayer in implementing the arrange-
ment has been his assumption that because the rental income is
taxed to the trust under sections 671-78, the rental payments are
deductible as business expenses. The argument inherent in the
taxpayer's assumption may be stated in syllogistic form as follows:
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 47.
24. The use of the liberal depreciation methods of § 167 (INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 167) will result in property being substantially depreciated within a few
years. The property can then be utilized in a transfer and leaseback arrangement
and a substantial rental deduction secured since rentals are related to the fair market
value rather than the tax basis of the property rented.
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2513, 2521.
27. REv. RuxL. 57-315, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 624.
28. Supra note 5.
29. REv. RuL. 54-9, 1954-1 Cumi. BuLL. 20. See, e.g., A. A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415,
420 (1947), rev'd, Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Johnson
v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936).
30. See, e.g., Alden B. Oakes, supra note 17; I. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963),
aff'd, Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965); Hall v. United States,




Major Premise: Rental payments required to be made to the owner of
property for the continued use of that property in the taxpayer's trade or
business are deductible under section 162 (a) (3).31
Minor Premises: The trustee of a trust which has satisfied sections 671-78
is the owner of the trust property for income tax purposes.
Conclusion: Rental payments required to be made to the trustee of a
trust which has satisfied sections 671-78 for the continued use of trust
property in the taxpayer's trade or business are deductible under section
162(a) (3).
The argument is sound if the characterization of the trustee as
owner of the trust corpus under sections 671-78 is generally a con-
trolling description of his status under the income sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. However, the Senate Report, in discussing
sections 671-78, states generally that the sections have no application
in determining the right of a grantor to rental deductions for pay-
ments to a trust under a transfer and leaseback arrangement.3 2 This
statement was adopted by the Commissioner in the regulations33
and its principle has found acceptance in the courts.
The right to the rental deduction has been resolved by a considera-
tion of the elements of control retained by the grantor in the particular
case.ns None of the decisions has given general approval or disap-
proval to the transfer and leaseback arrangement per se. A court's
conclusion that a particular leaseback arrangement does or does not
"pass muster" is frequently couched in imprecise language which
speaks of "economic realities," "shams," or "bona-fide transactions."
3 6
The conclusion, however, is generally posited on the court's subjective
evaluation of a number of factors, no one of which may be described
as determinative. These factors are similar to those which were used
before the 1954 Code to determine whether income of the trust should
be taxed to the grantor. The following discussion seeks to analyze
the Commissioner's arguments and the criteria considered relevant
by the courts and to discuss their ramifications for the estate planner
in planning and drafting a transfer and leaseback arrangement.
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3).
32. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1956).
34. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, supra note 30, at 443.
35. See Irvine K. Furman, 45 P-H TAx Or. REP. & MFR. DEc. f[ 45.32 (1966),
wherein the Tax Court condemned the particular arrangement but concluded as fol-
lows: "Our decision should not be construed as holding that we will disregard a trust
for Federal income tax purposes in all situations involving transfers in trust and
leasebacks. The decided cases reveal the standards to be applied. . . . The instant
arrangement simply does not pass muster." Id. at 259.
36. See, e.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, supra note 30 ("no real business pur-
pose"); Commissioner v. Greenspun, supra note 20 (arrangement held not to be




1. Prearrangement.-In some cases the leaseback of the property
transferred to the trust has been required by the terms of the trust
instrument.3' In others the trustee is merely given the power to
lease the trust corpus, and prearrangement is implied from the fact
that the leaseback follows closely in time the original transfer to the
trust.38 In Van Zandt v. Commissioner,39 the fact that the transfer
and leaseback were prearranged steps was given as one reason for
denying the rental deduction.40 However, it has been emphasized
in several decisions that a prior agreement to lease standing alone will
not defeat the rental deduction.4'
As a practical matter, there will always be some prearrangement.
If, as has been suggested by several writers, prearrangement makes
the trustee subservient to the grantor and causes him to act in
derogation of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust, then
its presence should reflect negatively on the validity of the transaction.
It is submitted, however, that prearrangement in this context is more
analogous to the settlor's normal specification of the type of invest-
ment which the trustee should select.4
3
From the planning standpoint, prearrangement in the form of a
specific direction in the trust instrument should generally be unneces-
sary. The asset has special value to the grantor as a part of his business
and he will invariably be willing to pay the trustee the highest
reasonable rental for its use.44 Therefore, observance by the trustee
of his fiduciary duty to make the trust property productive46 5 should
result in the leaseback to the grantor. The grantor might wish to
reserve the use of the property for a short period of time during which
arm's length negotiation of a lease could be accomplished.46 A final
planning technique for blunting the Commissioner's argument on
37. See, e.g., Skemp v. Commissioner, supra note 29.
38. See, e.g., Alden B. Oakes, supra note 17.
39. Supra note 30.
40. Id. at 444.
41. Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 18; Brown v. Com-
missioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950); Alden B. Oakes, supra note 17; Albert T.
Felix, supra note 18.
42. Cary, supra note 19, at 976; Kornfield, A New Look at Famliy-Trust-Lease-
back Arrangements, 104 TRusTs & EsTATEs 1121, 1186 (1965); 51 CoLUM. L. REv.
247, 249 (1951).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227 (1959). See also BOCERT, TnusTs &
TRUSTTES § 681 (2d ed. 1960); 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 227.14 (2d ed. 1956).
44. His willingness is not diminished by the fact that the lessor is a trustee holding
the property for the benefit of other members of his family.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TrUsTs § 181 (1959). See also BocART, op. cit. supra
note 43, § 611; 2 Scowt, op. cit. supra note 43, § 181.
46. For discussion of this suggestion see Cohen, Transfers and Leasebacks to Trusts:
Tax and Planning Considerations, 43 VA. L. lxv. 31, 45 (1957).
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this point is to make the leaseback for a fraction of the term of the
trust.4 7
2. Independence of the Trustee.-In Alden B. Oakes,48 the most
recent decision by the Tax Court upholding the validity of the
transfer and leaseback arrangement, the "actual independence" of
the trustee was described by the court as "one of the pivotal factors"
in its determination. 49 In I. L. Van Zandt,0 the Tax Court had
reached a contrary result and distinguished prior cases favorable
to the taxpayer on the ground that in those cases "the trustee's inde-
pendence was the determinative factor."5' The importance of the
interposition of an independent personality is further emphasized by
the lack of success which leasebacks directly with family members
have encountered.
52
The court's finding of independence, or the lack of it, in a given
case has not turned on the trustee's character as a technically "ad-
verse party,"53 but, rather, on an examination of the trustee's conduct
to determine his "actual independence."M Accordingly, if the trustee
has independently represented the interests of the trust, it is ap-
parently immaterial that the trustee is related to the grantor 55 or is
the attorney who was responsible for suggesting and planning the
arrangement.56
In addition to supporting the validity of the arrangement, the use
of an independent trustee should also avoid a question being raised
as to the reasonableness of the rentals agreed upon. A valuation
problem in this context would be particularly troublesome since the
asset leased has peculiar value to the grantor as a part of his existing
business.
47. See Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Lease-backs of Business Property
In Trust, 51 CoRNELL L. Q. 21, 46-47 (1965).
48. Supra note 17.
49. Id. at 529.
50. Supra note 30.
51. Id. at 830.
52. See, e.g., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951); Under v. Campbell,
P-H 1961 FED. TAx SEnv. (7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 547) ff 61-376 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
1960); Ernest V. Berry, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1077 (1964); Hilda M. Royce, 18 T.C.
761 (1952).
53. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 672.
54. A finding such as that made by the Tax Court in Albert T. Felix, supra note 18,
that "we find substantial evidence to justify the inference that the trustee did act
independently and in the best interest of the beneficiaries of the trust" is most
important.
55. See John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), in which the trustees were the tax-
payer's wife, father and accountant.
56. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), reversing, Helen




3. Taxpayer's Continued Occupancy of the Leased Property.-
One critic of the transfer and leaseback arrangement has described
the real issue in such a case to be "whether the grantors may be
permitted to consume their cake and have it too."5 7 This argument
emphasizes the taxpayer's continued physical possession of the
property. The argument, however, is not satisfying since it ignores
the changes in the taxpayer's legal and economic status effected by
the arrangement. After the transfer and leaseback, the taxpayer
occupies the property as a lessee and is under a legal obligation to
pay rentals to one who is under a fiduciary duty to demand their
payment.
58
4. Business Purpose.-Some courts have suggested that the existence
of a "business purpose" is an implied condition to the deductibility
of the rentals under section 162(a) (3). 59 This requirement has been
particularly emphasized in cases involving corporate participation in
a transfer and leaseback arrangement.
60
To state generally that a business purpose is required begs the
question. The real question is whether a business purpose is required
for the entire arrangement or merely for the leaseback agreement pur-
suant to which the rental payments are made. Admittedly, the
purposes behind the taxpayer's original transfer of the property to
the trust are non-business.
The two most recent decisions to consider the business purpose
requirement have taken divergent positions. In Van Zandt v. Com-
missioner,61 the Fifth Circuit, affirming the decision of the Tax Court,
denied the claimed rental deduction on the ground that the arrange-
ment, taken as a whole, served "no real business purpose."62  In
Alden B. Oakes,63 however, the Tax Court repudiated the position it
had taken in Van Zandt6 and held that a business purpose was needed
only for the leaseback under which the rental payments were made.6
57. Cary, supra note 19, at 976.
58. See RESTATMMNT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §§ 170, 181 (1959); BoGEnRT, op. cit. supra
note 43, §§ 543, 611; 2 ScoT, op. cit. supra note 43, §§ 170, 181.
59. See, e.g., Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1948).
The leading case on the business purpose doctrine is Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
60. See Finley v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128, 133 (10th Cir. 1958); Consolidated
Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 18, at 584; W. H. Armston Co. v. Com-
missioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174
F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949); Halsam Products Co., 11 CCH Tax¢ Ct. Mem. 87 (1952);
Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356 (1949), aff'd, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952).
61. Supra note 30.
62. Id. at 444.
63. Supra note 17.
64. Supra note 30.
65. Alden B. Oakes, supra note 17, at 532.
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Since, following the transfer to the trust, Dr. Oakes needed a build-
ing in which to carry on his medical practice, the lease of such a
building from the trustee was for a proper business purpose.
Should a court insist on a showing of a business purpose for the
whole arrangement, or did the Tax Court correctly reject this re-
quirement? It might be argued that section 162(a) (3) makes no
mention of "business purpose" and for a court to require the same
amounts to improper judicial legislation. However, section 162 (a) (3)
does provide that the payments to be deductible shall be "required to
be made ...for the purposes of the trade or business" of the tax-
payer.66 This language implies a payment made both under com-
pulsion and for a business reason.
It is submitted that this business purpose should be required only
for the rental payment and not for antecedent events or circumstances.
The requirement that a corporation act with business purpose in
both the transfer and the leaseback is not founded on section
162(a) (3) but on the general principle that corporations are business
entities and are expected to act for business reasons.67 Individual
decisions, however, are frequently motivated by non-business con-
siderations, and, if one is engaged in a business as a partner or
proprietor, his personal decisions will frequently affect the conduct of
his trade or business. For example, suppose a taxpayer has 5000
dollars cash in his personal bank account at a time when he needs a
new piece of equipment in his business. If the taxpayer decides to
use the cash in the purchase of a new pleasure automobile and to
rent the needed equipment, the Commissioner would surely not
disallow the rental deduction on the ground that there was no
business reason for each step in the taxpayer's decision-making pro-
cess leading to the rental payments. Section 162(a) (3) demands only
that a rental payment was required to be made for a business reason
and not that it might have been avoided by a different or better
exercise of personal or business discretion at some prior point in time.
5. Reasonableness of the Rentals.-Where a taxpayer has paid an
excessive amount as rent and the facts indicate that a portion of
the payment is intended as a dividend or gift, the procedure followed
in transactions between unrelated parties is to disallow the deduction
for that portion of the payment which is unreasonable. 68 Neverthe-
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3).
67. See Froehlich, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus; .Lease-
back Arrangements, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 956, 973 (1964).
68. See, e.g., Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 59; Logan Lumber Co.,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 735, 744 (1964); Sam Newman, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1107,




less, in the context of a transfer and leaseback arrangement, there is
the tendency to consider an unreasonable rent as evidence that the
entire transaction is not at arm's length and as grounds for denying the
deduction in toto.69 Therefore, the tendency to make rental payments
overly generous because they are inuring to the benefit of other
members of the lesee's family should be avoided.
6. Duration and Revocability.-In Van Zandt v. Commissioner,0
the short-duration of the trust and the existence of a reversionary
interest in the grantor supported in part the court's decision denying
the rental deduction. 71 The presence of these factors are, however,
not alone sufficient to invalidate the transaction.72 Any other con-
clusion would preclude the use of the short-term trust in the transfer
and leaseback arrangement, and this result has not been suggested
by any of the cases. The risks attendant to the arrangement may
be minimized by making the term of the trust substantially longer
than the minimum ten year period permitted by section 673.7
3
7. Retained "Equity.--Section 162(a)(3) allows a rental de-
duction only where the payments are for the taxpayer's use of that
property "in which he has no equity."74 These words were first used
in 1916 and the legislative history is silent as to their intended mean-
ing.75 They have uniformly been construed as intended to preclude
a business expense deduction for payments made by a mortgagor
to acquire property, as distinguished from payments made for its
continued use.76 If this traditional interpretation is accurate, then
the grantor's interest under a transfer and leaseback arrangement
is not a prohibited "equity," for the payments made pursuant to the
lease are for the use of the property and in no way add to his owner-
ship interest therein.
69. Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1955); Irvine K. Furman,
supra note 35, at 259.
70. Supra note 30.
71. Id. at 444. See also Irvine K. Furman, supra note 35, at 258.
72. See Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965), in which the transaction was upheld
although the duration of the trust was ten years with a reversion to the grantor's
wife.
73. This planning suggestion is discussed further in Cohen, supra note 46, at 44;
Oliver, supra note 47, at 47.
74. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3).
75. H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916); S. REp. No. 793, 64th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1916).
76. 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATON § 25.108 (3d ed. 1960). See also
Union Bag-Camp Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 730 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Breece Veneer
& Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956); Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25
(1948); Edward E. Haverstick, 13 B.T.A. 837 (1928). In Judson Mills, supra, the
Tax Court stated the test to be whether the taxpayer was "acquiring something of
value, that is, a certain equity in the machines, with each payment made in accordance
with the agreement." Id. at 32.
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In Alden B. Oakes,"7 however, the Tax Court defined "equity"
broadly to include "a right of redemption, a reversionary interest, a
right to specific performance, or in general any right respecting
property which traditionally would have been enforceable by means
of an equitable remedy."78 The court suggested that had Oakes not
conveyed his reversionary interest to his wife the same would have
constituted a prohibited "equity' within the meaning of section
162(a) (3).79 In Hall v. United States,80 an alternate ground for the
court's decision denying the rental deduction was that the extensive
controls retained by the grantors gave them an "equity" in the
property.8'
In neither case was the discussion of the taxpayer's "equity" es-
sential to the decision, and, it is submitted, when the question is
directly presented, the traditional interpretation of the term will be
followed. The Tax Court's definition of the term in Alden B. Oakes
82
simply proves too much. Every lessee has an "equity" in the leased
premises in the sense that he has rights under a valid lease agreement
which can be enforced in a court of equity by the remedies of in-
junction83 or specific performance. 84 Therefore, the Tax Court's defini-
tion would disallow the rental deduction in every case and render
section 162(a) (3) illusory.
In conclusion, to be effective for tax purposes the transfer and
leaseback must satisfy two tests-(1) the objective standards of
sections 671-78 which control the taxation of the rental income, and
(2) a variety of subjective criteria established by court decision
which determine the grantor's rental deduction. The importance of
careful planning and drafting of the various steps in the arrangement
to minimize tax exposures has been given repeated emphasis. It is
at this stage that a record of arm's length dealing between the grantor
and an independent trustee can be developed which should render
the arrangement relatively safe from attack.
77. Supra note 72.
78. Id. at 531.
79. Ibid.
80. CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) f1 9676 (N.D.N.Y. July
30, 1962).
81. Id. at 85,757.
82. Supra note 72.
83. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 53(b), 58 (1945).
84. 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 63(b) (1953).
85. See Cohen, supra note 46; Gibbs, Income Shifting-Recent Trends in Leaseback
Transactions, 19 Sw. L.J. 273, 275 (1965); Webster, Transfers to Trusts with Lease-
backs-Drafting and Other Suggestions for Trusts and Lease Agreements, So. CAL. 8rH
TAx INST. 319 (1956).
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C. Tax Policy Considerations
Should a trust's validity under sections 671-78 control both the
question of the taxation of income and the deductibility of the rentals
under a transfer and leaseback arrangement, or have the courts cor-
rectly decided that the allowability of the rental deduction turns
on a subjective evaluation of the controls retained by the grantor?
It is submitted that the tests set forth in sections 671-78 should be
the sole standard of the arrangement's validity for the following
reasons: (1) The terms of sections 671-78 suggest they were intended
to have application in other parts of the Code and the courts'
present approach frustrates this intention; and (2) The courts have
failed to draw any meaningful distinction between the question of
the person to whom the income is to be taxed and that of the allow-
ability of the rental deduction.
The final provision of section 671 suggests that sections 671-78 are
to find general application in other parts of the Code: 6
No items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable income
and credits of the grantor or of any other person solely on the grounds of
his dominion and control over the trust under section 61 (relating to
definition of gross income) or any other provision of this title, except as
specified in this subpart.87 (Emphasis added.)
The denial of the rental deduction under section 162(a) (3) for the
reasons given to date by the courts frustrates this policy, for it results
in a decrease of trust income and an increase in like amount of the
grantor's taxable income "solely on the grounds of his dominion and
control over the trust."8
Further, under section 67589 the grantor may deal with the trust
corpus or income, or may borrow the same in an arm's length trans-
action,90 without being treated as the owner of the trust. If, however,
business expenses incurred in connection with such transactions are
held non-deductible under other provisions of the Code by reason of
the grantor's retained controls over the trust, then sections 675(1)
and (2) are rendered illusory and the grantor's taxable income is
increased "solely on the grounds of his dominion and control over
the trust."91 A transaction, the validity of which is to be determined
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 671.
87. ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 675(l), (2).
90. The dealing must not be for less than an adequate and full consideration and
the power to borrow must not be one without adequate interest or security unless a
trustee other than the grantor is authorized generally to make loans to any person
without regard to interest or security. Ibid.
91. See INT. Rrtv. CoDE oF 1954, § 671.
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solely by reference to the objective standards of sections 671-78,
has been defeated by a reference to criteria of dominion and control
expressly rejected by Congress.92
Nevertheless, the fact that the trustee is characterized as the
"substantial owner" of the trust property for purposes of one part of
the Code does not per se compel the conclusion that he should be
"the owner" for purposes of other sections of the Code where owner-
ship is relevant. The question should always be whether differences
or similarities in characterization have a basis in reason and policy.93
For example, a transfer may be sufficient to make the trustee of a
trust the "owner" of trust corpus for purposes of the gift tax, and yet
the grantor may remain the "owner" for income and estate tax pur-
poses.9
In considering the transfer and leaseback arrangement, the courts
have stated that the income and deduction issues are separate and
distinct, but they have failed to articulate reasons for the distinction.
The grantor's right to a rental deduction has been resolved by the
same subjective evaluation of elements of dominion and control to
determine ownership as was made prior to 1954 to determine the
ownership of trust corpus for purposes of income taxation.95 The
enactment of sections 671-78 indicates Congress' intent that the income
tax consequences of transfers in trust should be determined, not by
a court's subjective evaluation of the dominion and control retained
by the grantor, but by the objective standards statutorily expressed.
If the determination to be made in testing the validity of a trans-
fer and leaseback arrangement is, as the cases to date indicate, one
of ownership resulting from dominion and control, then sections 671-
78 have enunciated the standards to be applied.96 However, if there
are policies operative under section 162(a) (3) which call for a con-
sideration of other factors, then these have not yet been expressed
by the Commissioner or the courts.
92. Ibid. See also H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1954); S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1954).
93. "The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules,
and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely
the same scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the
tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against." CooK, THE LocIcAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF CONF.zCT OF LAws 159 (1942), as quoted in CunmTHAM,
CONFLICT OF LAws 89 (5th ed. 1964).
94. See CASNEn, ESTATE PLAnNING 218-23 (3d ed. 1961).
95. See Froehlich, supra note 67, at 968.
06. "Perhaps it would be desirable to protect the revenue by amending § 162(a) (3)
to exclude from the business expense deductions now allowed those which become
necessary only because of intrafamily gifts of property used, or to be used, in business.
But that is a matter to be determined by Congress and, until it acts, I think the
courts are bound to give effect taxwise to gifts which are fully effective otherwise."
White v. Fitzpatrick, supra note 52, at 402 (Chase, J., dissenting).
196s 1 NOTES
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
III. THn FAmmy TRUST PARTNERSHIP
A. Planning the Transaction-Formal Aspects and
Tax Considerations
While the matter was surrounded by considerable doubt at common
law,97 the great weight of modem authority is to the effect that a
trustee can be a partner, and will be so recognized, for tax purposes. 8
There are, however, several practical difficulties in a trustee's acting
as a partner which must be resolved. As a general rule, it is impru-
dent for a trustee to invest the trust corpus in a trade or business,
whether conducted as a proprietorship or partnership .9 Also, the
trustee's entry into a partnership is thought to involve a rather extreme
delegation of his fiduciary duty because of the mutual agency rela-
tionship of partners. 100 Each of these obstacles, however, can be
overcome by an appropriate provision in the trust instrument authoriz-
ing the trustee to invest in a partnership.
1 1
A more serious objection from the trustee's standpoint is the un-
limited liability for partnership obligations to which he would be sub-
jected as a general partner.02 The gravity of the objection is further
emphasized by the fact that general partners are bound by the act
of any partner "for apparently carrying on in the usual way the busi-
ness of the partnership." 10 3 For this reason, it has been suggested that
a well-advised bank, or other corporate trustee, will generally refuse
to act as a general partner.1' 4 Another difficulty for the corporate
trustee is that it normally manages investment properties which re-
quire a minimum of personal supervision. Serving as a general
partner would be a novel and time-consuming task for such a
trustee which could pose substantial problems for the corporate
trustee as well as for the other partners. Therefore, if a general part-
nership interest is to be held in trust, the trustee will likely have to
97. BOGERT, TRusTs & TRUSTEES § 112 (2d ed. 1965); 1 Rowr., PA RTNEnsHP §
6.4 (2d ed. 1960).
98. WILmS, HANDBoox OF PARTaNEsRsm TAxAnToN 439 (1957). See Miller v.
Commissioner, 203 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1953); Theodore D. Stem, 15 T.C. 521 (1950);
I. W. Frank Trust, 44 B.T.A. 934 (1941); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(viii) (1964).
99. RESTATEMiENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment f. See also BOGERT, op. cit.
supra note 97; 3 Sco-r, TRUSTS §§ 227.6, 230.4 (2d ed. 1956).
100. 1 RowLEY, MODERN LAw OF PARTNERsHiI 598 (1916); 3 STAN. L. REv. 467,
468 (1951).
101. 3 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 99, §§ 227.6, 230.4.
102. UNwoEm PAMTNERsHip ACT § 15. See CRANE, PArNmaSmi' § 24 (2d ed. 1952).
103. UNwoRm PARTNERsHmp ACT §§ 9, 15. The partners are also liable for the
tortious act of any partner who at the time was "acting in the ordinary course of the
business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners." UNFORM
PARTNERSaP AT § 13.
104. See Smith, Shifting Income Within the Family Group, 30 TAXES 995, 999
(1952).
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be a personal acquaintance of the taxpayer, the taxpayer himself,
or one of the existing partners.
A corporate trustee may, however, be willing to serve as a special
or limited partner. In one case, for example, the American National
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago served as the trustee of limited
partnership interests. 10 5 The limited partner has no powers of manage-
ment and no personal liability beyond the amount of his stated contri-
bution. 0 6 He is essentially an investor who receives a share of the
partnership profits as the return on his investment.
1 7
The following discussion assumes that the foregoing problems of
trust and partnership law have been given consideration and that a
trustee has been found who is acceptable to the taxpayer and to the
other partners, if any, in the partnership.
The taxpayer who wishes to utilize a partnership interest in his
business as the corpus of a short-term trust for the benefit of other
members of his family may do so by one of two methods. He may
transfer an undivided interest in his business to a trustee to constitute
the trust corpus, 108 or he may transfer cash to the trustee which the
trustee is empowered to invest in the partnership. 10 9 Following the
transfer to the trust, a partnership agreement is generally entered
into between the grantor and the trustee. The desired tax conse-
quences from the arrangement are that the trust will be taxed on the
share of the partnership income distributed to it.
What are the relevant estate planning considerations in selecting
the family trust partnership arrangement generally and in evaluating
it vis-a-vis the transfer and leaseback arrangement? Generally, a trust
removes many of the uncertainties attendant to partnerships directly
with minor children. Absent a trust it must be shown that the minor
child is "competent to manage his own property and participate in
the partnership activities in accordance with his interest in the
property."0 This test will likely not be met in the case of most
minor children, and in other cases will present difficult problems of
proof."'
105. Leeb v. Jarecki, 156 F. Supp. 6, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1957). See also Edward D. Sultan,
18 T.C. 715, 717 (1952), aff'd, 210 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1954), wherein a trust company
served as trustee.
106. UNIFOHm LnmaTED PARTNEsHiP AcT §§ 4, 7, 17. See also CRANE, PARNEsHn
§ 24 (2d ed. 1952).
107. Ibid.
108. See, e.g., Stanback v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 514, 515 (4th Cir. 1959);
Wilson v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 613, 615 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Dreschler v. United
States, 161 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
109. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, supra note 98, at 351; Goldberg v. United
States, 152 F. Supp. 259, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(viii) (1964).
111. See, e.g., Batman v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1951) (part-
nership with 14 year old son held invalid); Arnold v. Green, 186 F.2d 18, 19 (5th
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The family trust partnership arrangement has the following ad-
vantages over the transfer and leaseback arrangement: (1) It can
be used to a greater extent to interest minor children in the family
business. (2) It avoids difficulties in selecting specific assets to be
committed to the trust over an extended number of years. This is
particularly helpful where a depreciation deduction would be lost
or where technological change in an industry is such that equipment
might be obsolescent prior to the expiration of the trust terms. (3)
It may pose fewer administrative problems since the payments to the
trust require only a division of profits at specified times in accordance
with percentages provided for in the partnership agreement.
The family trust partnership arrangement, however, is unavailable
where the taxpayer is a professional person who is precluded from
entering a partnership with non-professional persons, or where the
taxpayer's business is one in which capital is not a material income-
producing factor.112
B. Planning the Transaction-The Commissioner's Attack and the
Criteria Established by the Courts
In early cases, the same principles were applied to family trust
partnership arrangements as were applied to short-term trusts gen-
erally."13 The Commissioner attacked the arrangement under the
Clifford doctrine by emphasizing the controls retained by the grantor
over the partnership interest allegedly transferred to the trust.
However, the decisions by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Toweru4 and Commissioner v. Culbertson"5 announced new standards
by which the validity of family partnerships generally were to be
tested. In Commissioner v. Tower,"6 the Supreme Court promulgated
the rule that for husband and wife partnerships to be valid for tax
purposes, the wife had to "invest capital originating with her" or
"perform vital additional services."" 1 In Commissioner v. Culbert-
son,"" however, the Court altered this view, holding that the ultimate
Cir. 1951) (partnership with four minor daughters upheld); Pflugardt v. United States,
201 F. Supp. 379, 382 (E.D. Wisc. 1962) (partnership with minor children aged 1
to 3 years held invalid due to children's lack of "maturity or competence."); Finley
v. Healy, 187 F. Supp. 434, 438 (D. Mont. 1960) (partnership with four minor
children held valid due to evidence of "meticulous conduct of the business").
112. INr. BV. CODE OF 1954 § 704(e)(1).
113. See, e.g., Hash v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 838 (1946); Losh v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1944); Arm-
strong v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1944); Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C.
776 (1944).
114. 327 U.S. 280 (1945).
115. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
116. Supra note 114.
117. Id. at 290.
118. Supra note 115.
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test was the presence of a bona fide intent to form a 'partnership. 19
The original capital and vital services criteria were described as merely
indicia of the presence or absence of the requisite intent.1o Follow-
ing these decisions, it was held that the family trust partnership
to be effective for tax purposes had to satisfy both the Clifford
doctrine and the recently announced standards for family partner-
ship validity. 12'
In 1951, Congress expressly rejected the original capital and vital
services tests in enacting what is now section 704(e) of the Code.
122
To qualify as a family partnership under section 704(e) a business
must meet two requirements: (1) capital must be a material income-
producing factor;'23 and (2) the partners, other than the donor,
must "own" capital interests in the partnership. 24 If these require-
ments are met, it is irrelevant that a partner's capital was non-original
and was received by gift or purchase. 25 Further, the whole arrange-
ment need not be supported by any business purpose. 126 The legis-
lative history and the regulations under section 704(e) clearly indi-
cate that the donee's ownership of the capital interest is to be de-
termined by the Commissioner and the courts on a case by case
factual analysis of the "incidents of ownership" retained by the donor
and the "dominion and control" exercised by the donee to determine
the "bona fides of the particular transaction."
27
The legislative history of sections 671-78 states the intent that the
rules as to family partnerships are not affected by Subpart E, even
though a partnership interest is held in trust.u 8 This statement has
been adopted by the Commissioner in the regulations under section
671.129
Therefore, as in the transfer and leaseback arrangement, before a
particular type of property can be utilized as short-term trust corpus,
the controls retained by the grantor must be measured in light of both
the objective standards of sections 671-78 and a set of subjective
119. Id. at 742.
120. Id. at 745.
121. See, e.g., Stanback v. Robertson, 183 F.2d 889, 893 (4th Cir. 1950); Edward D.
Sultan, supra note 105, at 725.
122. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 704(e). See H.R. REP'. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 32 (1951).
123. INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 704 (e) (1).
124. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 704(e)(1).
125. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 704(e) (1).
126. See H. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)
(2)(x) (1964).
127. See H. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951); Treas. Reg. § 1.704(e)
(1) (ii) (1964).
128. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1954).
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1956).
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tests judicially established. In this case the subjective standards are
those rules of family partnership validity developed under section
704(e).
The following discussion considers certain controls which grantors
of short-term trusts typically retain and which are perfectly permis-
sible under sections 671-78, but which may raise a question as to
the trust's validity under the subjective rules of family partnership
validity.
1. Independence of the Trustee.-Under sections 671-78 the grantor
of a short-term trust may designate himself or a person amenable to
his will as trustee, and, provided certain prohibited powers are not
exercisable by the trustee, the grantor will not be regarded as the
substantial owner of the trust corpus.130
The subjective rules of family partnership validity accord some
weight to the trustee's technically independent status in determining
whether he is the "real owner" of a partnership interest.13' Much
more important, however, is a finding of the trustee's actual inde-
pendence based on the conduct of the parties and the provisions of the
trust and partnership agreements. The regulations under section
704(e) recognize that the grantor or a person amenable to his will
may be the trustee,132 and the decided cases are to the same effect.
33
A number of cases have sustained the family partnership trust arrange-
ment where the grantor'3 or one related or subordinate to the
grantor' was the trustee. Similarly, the mere presence of a corporate
trustee has not saved an arrangement when the trustee did not
independently represent the beneficiaries in the business as fully as
130. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 674-77.
131. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1964). In the following cases the fact
that the trustee was an independent personality was given as one factor in support of the
trust's validity: West v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1954); Edward
D. Sultan, supra note 105, at 725; Louis R. Eisenmann, 17 T.C. 1426, 1433 (1952).
In Smith v. Westover, 237 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1956), the fact that the grantors served
as trustees was given by the court as one reason for holding the arrangement invalid.
Id. at 203.
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(vii) (1964).
133. See, e.g., Dreschsler v. United States, supra note 108, at 324; Dickstein v.
McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Goldberg v. United States, supra note
109.
134. See, e.g., Neil v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1959); Dreschlier v.
United States, supra note 108; Miller v. Commissioner, supra note 98; Theodore D.
Stem, supra note 98; Armstrong v. Commissioner, supra note 113.
135. See, e.g., Pike v. United States, 231 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1956) (wife trustee for
three minor children); Maiatico v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (wife
trustee for minor children); Broide v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1957)
(sister-in-law of grantor and employee of partnership trustees for minor children);
Herbert Shainberg, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 201 (1953) (grantor's attorney and
employee of partnership trustees for minor children).
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his partnership status would have permitted.136
It is suggested that a stronger case frequently may be presented
where the trustee is the grantor or a person amenable to his will, since
the existing partners will be less hesitant to have such a person be
fully active in the affairs of the partnership.
2. Duration and Revocability.-The grantor may retain a rever-
sionary interest in the trust corpus without being treated as the sub-
stantial owner of the trust under sections 671-78 provided the interest
does not take effect in possession or enjoyment within ten years.
137
The Commissioner, however, has taken the position in unpublished
rulings that such a reversionary interest in the grantor deprives the
trustee of the "full and complete ownership" necessary to a valid
family partnership. 138 Two writers on the subject have asserted that it
is unsafe to transfer a partnership interest to a trust, the corpus of
which reverts to the grantor after ten years. 139
Neither section 704(e) nor sections 671-78 suggest that the existence
of a reversionary interest in the grantor will result in the ipso facto
invalidation of the arrangement, and the decided cases are to the same
effect. In several cases, the absence of a reversionary interest in the
grantors is referred to as one relevant factor in holding the trust valid
under section 704(e),140 and, in at least one case, the possibility of a
reverter to the grantors has been given as a ground for its invalidity.141
Nevertheless, in none of the cases has this "incident of ownership"
alone been regarded as determinative.
It is submitted that a reversion to the grantor after a period of years
is merely one factor to be considered in determining the trustee's
"full and complete" ownership. The reversionary interest in the
grantor is in derogation of the trustee's ownership of the partnership
interest in two respects: (1) it arbitrarily limits the duration of the
partnership; and (2) it provides that the partnership interest will
vest in another as owner at a given point in time. The setting of an
arbitrary limit on the duration of the trust and, therefore, on the
136. See, e.g., Solomon v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1953) (bank and
trust company); Stanback v. Robertson, supra note 121 (bank and trust company
was co-trustee); Feldman v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1950) (independent
individual); Leeb v. Jarecki, supra note 105 (bank and trust company).
137. INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 672.
138. The rulings are discussed in- Herzfield, Grantor of Family Partnership Interest
to Clifford Trust Is Taxable, IRS Says, 15 J. TAxATIoN 50 (1961).
139. See WrLr.rs, op. cit. supra note 98, at 439; Froehlich, Clifford Trusts: Use of
Partnership Interests as Corpus; Leaseback Arrangements, 52 CAlIF. L. RFv. 956, 965
(1964).
140. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, supra note 98, at 352; Goldberg v. United
States, supra note 109, at 264; Thomas H. Brodhead, 18 T.C. 726, 735 (1952).
141. Boyt v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 1954).
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trustee's participation in the partnership, has never been held to
affect the trustee's ownership during the term of the trust. For
example, trusts have frequently been held valid even though the
trust instrument provided that the trust shall terminate and the
corpus be distributed to the beneficiaries at a certain time after the
grantor's death,14 or when the beneficiaries "become of age"'1 3 or
attain a certain age.14 These decisions would seem to be authority
for the proposition that one's ownership of a capital interest in a
partnership at a given time is not affected by the fact that another
will later become the owner of the same property.
The grantor's reversionary interest should affect partnership validity
only where its existence is used by the grantor as leverage to subvert
the trustee's full present ownership of the trust corpus. If the trustee
independently exercises the rights of one owning a capital interest
in partnership, his ownership of the interest should be unaffected by
the fact that another, even the grantor, will be the owner of the
interest at a future date. In planning the family partnership trust
arrangement, the Commissioner's argument on this point might be
blunted somewhat by making the term of the trust longer than ten
years or by selecting an independent person to act as trustee.
3. Restrictions on Trustee's Powers.-If the trustee is an inde-
pendent personality and a stranger to the business, it is unlikely that
either he or the existing partners will favor his assumption of full
partnership discretion and authority. The tendency will be to in-
clude restrictions on the trustee's powers either in the trust instrument
or the partnership agreement. Such limitations may be consistent with
the trustee's status as the substantial owner of the trust corpus under
sections 671-78, but inconsistent with his full and complete owner-
ship of a capital interest in the partnership under the family partner-
ship rules.
The conclusion as to what restrictions may be imposed on a trustee
consistent with the family partnership rules generally turns on the
answers to two questions: (1) What type of partner is the trustee
under the trust instrument and the partnership agreement? (2) Does
the trustee possess and exercise the full powers which a partner of
this type normally possesses and exercises under the applicable local
law? 145 For example, if the trustee is a limited partner, he will not
142. See, e.g., Thomas H. Brodhead, supra note 140; Theodore D. Stern, supra note
98.
143. See, e.g., Maiatico v. Commissioner, supra note 135; Herbert Shainberg, supra
note 135.
144. See, e.g., West v. Commissioner, supra note 131; Sanford H. Hartman, 43 T.C.
105 (1964); Edward D. Sultan, supra note 105.
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (1964).
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be expected to actively participate in the management decisions of
the partnership. His activities will be confined to the periodic review
of partnership affairs to determine the status of his investment.
146
Further, even though the trustee is a general partner, one of the other
general partners may be designated the managing partner, thus re-
lieving the trustee of responsibility for the day to day operation of
the business.
147
A finding that there were significant powers withheld from the
trustee which partners of that type can, and generally do, possess is
generally fatal to the family trust partnership arrangement. The
following holding is illustrative:
Under Illinois law the limited partners could have been given considerably
fuller power of ownership over their investments in the partnership. In the
partnership context, a limited partner whose property interest in the
partnership originates with a general partner may be regarded as the true
owner of that property notwithstanding that the general partner retains
substantial powers over it, provided that the powers retained are such as are
normally incident to that type of partnership. This proviso is not satisfied
by a partnership agreement which places substantial restrictions upon the
limited partners' rights to withdraw or assign their interests in the partner-
ship, restrictions which are not normally incident to a limited partnership
organized under Illinois law.148
In conclusion, the estate planner who is considering the use of a
partnership interest as the corpus of a short-term trust must be aware
of the two sets of operative standards which the arrangement must
satisfy.
C. Tax Policy Considerations
The policy question involved is basically the same as that raised
in connection with the discussion of the transfer and leaseback ar-
rangement: 149 Should a trustee who is the "substantial owner" of
trust corpus under the provisions of sections 671-78 also be considered
the "owner" of a capital interest in a partnership under section 704(e)
where a partnership interest is utilized as trust corpus? As with the
transfer and leaseback arrangement, the ultimate question is stated
in terms of ownership under both sections 671-78 and the additional
subjective standards applied by the courts to measure the arrange-
146. See Edward D. Sultan, supra note 105, where the Tax Court held a family
partnership trust arrangement valid even though the grantor retained entire control of
the business on the ground that such control was "of no particular significance since
limited partners normally have no part in the control or management of the business."
Id. at 723.
147. See, e.g., Robert P. Scherer, supra note 113.
148. Leeb v. Jarecki, supra note 105, at 11.
149. See text accompanying notes 86-95 supra.
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ment's validity under other sections of the Code.
Section 671 enunciates the broad policy that the determination of
the trustee's ownership of trust corpus under Subpart E is not to be
upset under any other section of the Code on the grounds of the
grantor's dominion and control over the trust property.1 50
It was suggested that the subjective criteria applied by the courts
to determine the grantor's rental deduction under a transfer and
leaseback arrangement were nothing more than a determination of
ownership based on dominion and control, and, therefore, needlessly
frustrated the intent of Congress in enacting Subpart E.
It is submitted, however, that the subjective tests of family partner-
ship validity, while they may be couched in terms of the trustee's
"ownership of a capital interest," are not essentially concerned with
determining the trustee's ownership of trust corpus based on an evalua-
tion of the grantor's retained dominion and control. Rather, they are
concerned with whether the relationship over a period of time between
two personalities-the grantor and the trustee-was that of partnership.
Therefore, the application of the family partnership rules to the
short-term trust where a partnership interest is used as trust corpus
does not replace or frustrate sections 671-78, but rather applies supple-
mental standards which are demanded by the terms and policy of
section 704(e) .151
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151. Contra, Herzfleld, supra note 138.
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